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by EOS Intelligence EOS Intelligence No Comments

China’s Investments in Africa Pave Way for Its Dominance

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Connecting nearly 70 countries through an extensive land network and sea routes across Asia, Europe, and Africa, the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative is the focal point of China’s foreign policy that is publicized as providing various economic developmental opportunities. Proposed by China’s President, Xi Jinping, in September 2013, the action plan and framework of the OBOR, also known as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was officially presented in March 2015. Since the unveiling, the initiative has gained huge momentum in certain parts of the world. Africa is one such region that has witnessed major infrastructural development across road and rail network, telecommunication, and energy sectors in the early stages of BRI.

Africa is keen on receiving investment from China to boost its economic development. Owing to its location, the continent, as such, is placed perfectly on the sea route as part of China’s global plan. Although the continent lies on the Maritime Silk Road, the sea route that connects Indian Ocean to Suez Canal via Red Sea, only few African countries are of direct strategic importance to China along the OBOR route (including Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Djibouti). However, in its growth strategy, China is involved in several projects to increase its presence across other African nations as well.

Focus on strategic sectors

China is focusing intensely on infrastructure projects in the initial years of this initiative, as strengthening the railway and road network across the countries and developing sea ports is crucial for the success of the project. However, the expansion plans are not only limited to logistics. China is also investing heavily in other sectors, such as energy, mining, and telecommunications.

China’s Investments in Africa Pave Way for Its Dominance

Logistics and industrial zones

China is involved in a number of mega infrastructure projects in Africa. Railway projects rolled out by Chinese companies across Africa are amongst the ones (along with road network and sea ports projects) that have gained momentum in terms of execution and become operational ahead of scheduled time. The Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (Madaraka Express) in Kenya at a cost of US$3.2 billion, built by China Road and Bridge Corporation (a Chinese state-owned construction and engineering company) and funded by China Exim Bank (90% funding by the bank and remaining 10% by Kenya government) connecting Mombasa to Nairobi, became operational in June 2017 (construction of the railway line began in January 2015) as against the timeline of four years. In due course, the line will link Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan to Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa Light Rail Transit (AA-LRT) built by China Railway Group Limited, a Chinese construction company. Initiatives such as this, when married with port connectivity across sea-based countries, will not only improve trade amongst nations within the continent but will also boost Africa’s commerce market by opening new trade routes with other continents.

Some of the railway projects initiated by China were planned long before OBOR came to play, however, they could still form a crucial part of the initiative. For instance, the Tanzania-Zambia railway line built in 1970 with the technical and financial aid from China, is now being revived again with the help of Chinese companies Plans are underway to link it with other ports and build an industrial economic belt along the railway line to utilize the line more effectively. Chinese government has given Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) a US$22.4 million interest-free loan to not only improve the operations but also to extend the line to other countries that include Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. This line is of strategic importance to China in terms of better connectivity, which could lead to improved trade partnerships in the future, as this is the only railway line in Africa that connects three economic blocs, namely East African Community, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

China is effectively planning for future stability of its position in the continent, as evident from its plan to build Africa’s largest free trade zone in Djibouti, considered as China’s gateway to the continent.

China is effectively planning for future stability of its position in the continent, as evident from its 2016 announcement to build Africa’s largest free trade zone in Djibouti, considered as China’s gateway to the continent, spread over an area of 48 sq. km. The port will be built by Dalian Port Corporation Limited, Chinese largest port operator, and is expected to handle US$7 billion in trade within two years of becoming operational. About 15,000 direct and indirect jobs are expected to be created from the project. Strengthening Djibouti air transport sector is also of crucial importance to China and in light of this, two new airports – Hassan Gouled Aptidon International Airport and Ahmed Dini Ahmed International Airport – are also being set up to boost connectivity between the two countries. Funded by the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), a Chinese construction engineering company, at a combined cost of US$599 million, this paves way for the country’s economic growth and development by making it a trade hub.

Telecommunications

China Communications Services Corporation Limited (also known as China Comservice), a subsidiary of China Telecommunications Corporation, is planning to revamp the original Africa Information Superhighway to Trans Africa Information Superhighway, an information and communication technology (ICT) project. The 20,000 km long optical cable is expected to pass through 48 African countries and involves an investment of US$10 billion. With growing internet penetration in many African countries (as per World Bank report, Kenya had an internet penetration rate of 45.6% in 2015 which was above the world’s average of 44%), the ICT project offers huge potential.

Mining and energy

China has already been heavily investing in energy, power, and mining sectors in Africa as part of its FDI policy, and now under the OBOR initiative the investments are expected to rise further. China General Nuclear Power Holding Corporation (CGNPC), a Chinese player that develops, constructs, and operates power plants, started mining uranium in the western-central part of Namibia in 2016. Known as the Husab Uranium Project or Husab Mine, it is amongst China’s largest projects in Africa, and has received investment worth US$2 billion, expected to produce 6.8 million kilograms of uranium oxide every year.

Although China has been investing in Africa for development of renewable energy projects, China’s focal point on the energy and power sector under OBOR initiative is still diluted. However, investments across this sector can be expected to happen in the near future owing to abundance of natural resources in the continent.

EOS Perspective

China’s OBOR initiative seems to be successfully transitioning from a theoretical plan to reality, at least within African continent. It provides developing countries across Africa what they need the most – infrastructure (roads, railways, sea ports, airports, power plants, refineries) along with supporting various other sectors such as information technology, telecom, and financial services. Apart from streamlining infrastructural development in Africa, African countries can also benefit in terms of better trade within the continent as China plans to build high speed rails, ports, and roads across the continent as indicated in the memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the African Union (AU), signed in 2015. Though this means some good news in terms of job creation, infrastructural development, and overall growth, African nations need to strategically think and analyze how they can emerge truly stronger in the run for economic development, without the threat of being increasingly dominated by the Chinese influence.

Projects undertaken as part of OBOR are of great size and offer growth opportunities, but also involve large amount of investment, long periods of construction, and associated operational risks – we wrote about it in our article OBOR – What’s in Store for Multinational Companies? in July 2017. African domestic stakeholders should wisely chalk out their approach tactics and secure participation in implementation plans when partnering with Chinese companies, in order to favor their own economic and sustainable development as well as share in benefits. Governments and local leaders of each African country will have to play an active and important role in negotiating and finalizing business terms with Chinese companies, if they want these partnerships to benefit their country and local population in the long run.

African stakeholders should secure participation when partnering with Chinese companies, in order to favor their own economic and sustainable development as well as share in benefits.

While it cannot be denied that African countries are surely bound to benefit from the OBOR initiative, it is the Chinese companies leading these projects that will reap the largest benefits as well as China that will intensify and strengthen its economic hold in the region. Starting off with successful road and railway projects in Africa, Chinese companies are going to focus on sectors such as manufacturing and real estate in the coming years. Presence of natural resources in the continent is also likely to attract Chinese players in the mining sector. And with so much investment already happening in the initial phase of OBOR, Chinese players are planning for the long haul by developing large industrial zones to avoid issues related with labor costs and tariffs.

This sudden inclination of China towards developing and helping African nations seems overwhelming. It draws attention to the fact that China may try to overpower and dominate the economic and geo-political scenario across Africa in disguise of offering the countries development opportunities. With easy loans, with no stringent clauses related to intellectual property, legal matters, and human rights policies, all of which are conditions far more attractive than those that would be offered by China’s Western counterparts, China makes sure to have an upper hand in all the projects that are undertaken as part of the OBOR initiative.

With loans from Chinese banks and projects led by Chinese companies, there is no doubt that the Chinese influence in the continent is already on the rise. While the immediate effect of growing Chinese dominance in Africa will first be realized in the countries that fall directly on the OBOR sea route (or are easily connected to these sea routes via road and rail), other regions, that are currently not on the OBOR map, are highly likely to also witness the rising control of Chinese companies in less than a decade.

It is also being speculated that if Chinese investment continues to grow at this speed, it can be expected that in relatively near future many sectors will be dominated by Chinese companies, leaving no room for African players to grow. This could lead to exploitation of African players by the Chinese side, local governments finding themselves under huge debt with Chinese banks hampering plans for domestic development, and leaving local people to deal with meaner jobs as all the high paid jobs would be retained with the Chinese – these are just a few of possible immediate repercussions, but the list might not end here.

If Chinese investment continues to grow at this speed, it can be expected that in relatively near future many sectors will be dominated by Chinese companies.

A drive such as OBOR definitely seems to greatly contribute to putting the African economy on a growth path by pouring the much needed billions of dollars to link China’s trade route to African countries through a strategized set-up of railways, roads, sea ports, and airports thus opening doors for investment in other sectors as well. In the short term, it is clear that African countries have more to gain than to lose when receiving huge investments from China as this drives the continent towards economic prosperity. But China’s intentions behind investing in developing African economies, under the disguise of OBOR initiative, might be more than meets the eye. In the long run, Africa’s economic scene may be China-dominated, not only reshaping the continents’ infrastructural and business scenario, but also initiating a new phase of globalization and development, which most of the African nations have been void off for a long time.

Amid these discussions of the extent to which African nations will let China take control in the name of growth, one thing is clear that China is a strong ally for African nations and the association can only be expected to strengthen under OBOR. Both China and Africa stand to gain from this association – China to notch up a step to reach its goal for global expansion by leaving an imprint on the continent that will be clearly visible for decades to come, and Africa, with regular investment from China, to work on the development and economic upliftment of the continent.

by EOS Intelligence EOS Intelligence No Comments

Venezuela – Economic Crisis Strikes Consumers and Companies

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Venezuela, a country considered as a role model economy for other Latin American countries a few decades ago, has now fallen into deep economic, social, and political crisis that seems to never end. Venezuela’s economy, highly dependent on oil exports, witnessed a steep decline when global oil prices dropped dramatically during 2014-2017, followed by the government ill-treating national funds, and a massive reduction in import of goods. Under this scenario, several multinational companies, such as PepsiCo, Palmolive, and Coca Cola, chose to reduce or temporarily cease production in the country, which has led to increased unemployment. As a result, many Venezuelans started to flee the country in search for a better life quality, while those who chose to stay face low salaries, hyperinflation, empty supermarket shelves, and increasing violence as political turmoil is deepening amid opposition and criticism of the current government of Nicolas Maduro.

The root of the problem

Venezuela’s deep social and economic crisis is driven mainly by mismanagement of national funds and lack of investment in industries of national importance. For several years, the Venezuela’s government-established projects involved providing social aid for households with low income, and these programs were supported by revenue generated through oil exports. Therefore, as gas and oil sector revenue accounts for 25% of the country’s GPD, a steep plunge in global oil prices from US$85 in 2014 to US$36 in 2016 deeply affected Venezuela’s social projects turning them unsustainable.

Venezuela’s deep social and economic crisis is driven mainly by mismanagement of national funds and lack of investment in industries of national importance.

In addition, Venezuela did not invest in its oil industry, one of the main pillars of the country’s economy. Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PVDSA) the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company has witnessed limited investment, causing Venezuela’s crude oil production to decline from 2.7 million barrels per day in 2014 to two million in 2017, expected to further crumble to 1.4 million barrels per day in 2018. This also translated into a decrease in oil exports revenue by 64% during 2010-2015, deepening scarcity of funds and progressing economic instability in the country.

Venezuela - Economic Crisis Strikes Consumers and Companies

Plummeting imports in import-dependent economy

Venezuela has been highly dependent on imported goods and raw materials such as food staples and medicines, among other goods. After the fall in oil prices and decrease of crude oil production, Venezuela redirected a large percentage of the remaining revenue from oil export to repay foreign debt, drastically reducing import volume of goods. As a result, imports severely dropped from US$58.7 billion in 2012 to US$18 billion in 2016, leaving the country with shortage of wide range of goods, including pharmaceuticals, sugar, corn, wheat, etc.

Soaring inflation and unemployment

In addition, Venezuela established strict price control regulations as a way to counterbalance hyperinflation, which directly hindered production of goods by multinational companies. Consequently, several key market players reduced or partially stopped operations in the country as a way to avoid losing profits. In February 2018, Colgate Palmolive, a US-based consumer goods company, stopped production for a week after the government demanded that the company reduces the price of its products, which resulted in a large loss in profit for the company. Subsequently, the reduction of multinationals’ operations in Venezuela greatly increased the unemployment rate to 30% as of 2018, causing Venezuelans to opt for unreported employment or to flee the country looking for job opportunities. It is estimated that between one to two million Venezuelans will have migrated by the end of 2018.

EOS Perspective

Throughout 2017, the ministry of urban farming encouraged people to grow food, e.g. tomatoes and lettuce, at their homes and to start eating rabbits as a way to prevent starvation as a result of massive shortage of basic goods. Meanwhile, as a way to ease the situation, Venezuelan authorities sell a monthly bag containing corn flour, beans, rice, pasta, dried milk, and some canned foods at VE$25,000 – this is less than a dollar. These bags with food are distributed only among people registered in the communal councils and those who possess a Carnet de la Patria, a home registry system in order to receive the food. Additionally, president Maduro decided to open 3,000 popular meal centers as part of a nutritional recovery scheme seeking to feed hungry Venezuelans. However, none of these measures have clearly had enough impact to aid in the difficult situation amid the deepening crisis in Venezuela.

Migration to neighboring countries in Latin America has been the way many Venezuelans have found to escape the crisis. Argentina, Chile, and Colombia, among other Latin America countries, have received over 629,000 Venezuelans in 2017 alone, which is 544,000 more Venezuelans than in 2015. The mere number of fleeing people indicates the scale of the issue, yet the socialist administration of Nicolas Maduro refused to accept any help, aggravating the already strained political relationships with his Latin American counterparts. Further, Venezuela also refused to accept any aid from international institutions such as the WHO, which would help as a short-term solution or at least a relief for starving Venezuelans.

Moreover, Venezuela seems to be continuing to drown, as South American trade bloc Mercosur – one of the most important commercial blocs in the region, suspended Venezuela’s membership indefinitely in 2017. Such a measure translates into further reduction of imports into Venezuela from the bloc and, potentially, Venezuelans banned from legally migrating to any of the countries from the Mercosur bloc. So far, South American countries have welcomed waves of Venezuelans, but the dormant prohibition could negatively affect a considerable volume of the population seeking to flee from the crisis.

Venezuela seems to be continuing to drown, as Mercosur suspended Venezuela’s membership indefinitely in 2017. Such a measure translates into further reduction of imports by Venezuela from the bloc.

In addition, the USA issued an executive order banning any American financial institution from investing in Venezuela, that same year, which restricted the inflow of capital and increased the financial isolation of Venezuela from the North American markets.

This dramatic situation, both in Venezuela’s domestic as well as international arena, calls for president Maduro to reevaluate and encourage reforms that should empower small domestic producers, e.g. coffee makers, agricultural producers, among others, in order to reactivate internal consumption and counterbalance shortage of food and other supplies. Further, it is high time that the country’s leadership opens their borders to external help, however this seems unlikely to happen, considering that this would mean an acknowledgment that the socialist political management of the country has failed, and this in turn would play into Maduro’s opposition’s hands to easily overturn his government.

by EOS Intelligence EOS Intelligence No Comments

China’s Cross-Border E-Commerce Sector Enjoying Government Support – But for How Long?

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It is a well-known fact that China, today, is the largest and fastest growing e-commerce market globally. Accounting for close to half of the global e-commerce sales, China’s e-commerce industry is witnessing a double-digit growth, rising by about 26% in 2016. Leading the growth in China’s e-commerce sector is cross-border e-commerce (CBEC), which is currently witnessing close to double the growth compared with the overall industry and is expected to continue to grow robustly over the next five years. The government has not only been charging favorable duty to promote CBEC, but has also created special customs-clearing zones in 13 cities to support cross-border trade. However, in 2016, the government came up with a new set of taxation and a list of items that were allowed to be only imported. Following a significant industry pressure, the government has pushed the implementation of these rules to the end of 2018, and it now remains to be seen whether the industry will continue to receive government support which is instrumental for it to flourish.

Cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) has been creating quite a buzz globally, and leading this global trend is China, one of fastest growing markets with respect to CBEC. A plethora of social factors such as improved standards of living, increased awareness about foreign products through greater international travel as well as access to information online, increased quality consciousness among consumers, limited options available locally (especially in product categories such as infant milk formula and health supplements) have resulted in escalated demand for international products in China. All these factors, along with the ease of buying through e-commerce and the growing tendency of Chinese people to use their mobile phones to shop, have resulted in exponential growth of the CBEC sector in the country.

China’s CBEC Industry – At a Glance

Retail Sales and Growth: The industry was estimated at US$85.8 billion in sales in 2016 and is expected to double up sales to about US$158 by 2020. The number of CBEC customers in China is estimated to rise from about 181 million in 2016 to close to 292 million in 2020.

Trade Partners and Goods: The UK, USA, Australia, France, and Italy are some of China’s largest trading partners with regards to CBEC. Cosmetics, food and healthcare products, mother and child solutions (including infant formula), clothing and footwear are the most shopped categories through CBEC.

Consumer Profile: About 65% of the customers are male and 75% are between the age of 24 and 40. Most of the customers are well-educated, with three-fourth of them having at least a graduate degree. The ticket size for about half of these purchases ranges between US$15 and US$75 (RMB100-500).

Leading Players: Most cross-border online sales are undertaken through third-party online marketplaces such as TMall Global (owned by Alibaba group) and JD Worldwide (owned by JD Group, China’s second largest e-commerce player). Global e-commerce leader, Amazon is also becoming increasingly active in China.

The government has also provided immense support to the CBEC sector, a fact that has been critical to the market growth. As an effort to weed out the illegal grey market imports and to promote e-commerce, China’s government relaxed cross-border e-commerce rules and the applicable custom rates (close to 15 to 60% depending on the item). Moreover, custom duty amounting to less than US$7.5 (RMB50) was exempted. The government also created 13 CBEC zones across the country in order to expedite custom clearing of foreign items ordered online. These zones house large warehouses where foreign brands and retailers stock items, which, upon being ordered, are put through custom clearance (under relaxed rules). This way the consumer receives foreign goods within few days of ordering it.

While this has been greatly benefiting the Chinese consumers who now have an access to a range of products that were once seemingly out of reach for the public at large, it is also revolutionizing how foreign players are operating in China. Traditionally, foreign companies (brands) required to have a legal entity in China (subsidiary, partner, or own manufacturer) to import goods through the general trade channels. These legal entities had the task to clear import customs and pay duties on goods imported into the country. However, under the CBEC channel, these foreign players are freed from the requirement of establishing a local entity before selling their goods in the Chinese market. This also relieves companies from several compliance procedures that they were required to follow in case they were entering the market through offline trade channels. Therefore, several players, who shied away from China in the past (owing to cumbersome product registration and approval process), are looking at this as their entry strategy in the market. Simpler compliance checks and reduced import taxes have also made it easy for companies to experiment and launch a host of products (on a hit and miss basis) in the Chinese market without much investment.

However, while CBEC has greatly supported the cause of promoting e-commerce and aiding international companies in accessing the Chinese markets, it has seriously hampered the business of several domestic players (especially in the cosmetics and health supplements industry) who have been protected from foreign competition in the past owing to strict import rules. Moreover, it has resulted in a major disadvantage for conventional retailers with a brick and mortar setup as goods sold through the CBEC route are levied with a lower number of taxes compared with similar goods sold through traditional trade channels in China.

Owing to these factors, in April 2016, the government revised the taxation rates for CBEC goods resulting in a marginal increase in taxes for few categories. Under the new rules, products would be temporarily levied with 0% import tariff but would be taxed at 70% of the applicable VAT and consumption tax rate, which changes based on the product category. For instance, cosmetics worth RMB500 (US$75) ordered through CBEC would be taxed 0% import tariff + VAT at 11.9% (i.e. 70% of applicable VAT rate for cosmetics – 17%) + consumption tax at 21% (i.e. 70% of applicable consumption tax for cosmetics – 30%), thereby, making the total amount equal to RMB664.5 (US$100). In addition to the changes in taxation, the government removed the waiver of custom duty of up to US$7.5 (RMB50) and set a limit of US$302 (RMB2,000) on a single transaction and of US$3,020 (RMB20,000) on purchase by a single person per year. It also released a list (termed as a ‘positive list’) of 1,293 products that were allowed to enter the Chinese market through CBEC. While the goods under the ‘positive list’ are exempted from submitting an import license to customs, few products from this list that come under China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA), such as cosmetics, infant formula, medical devices, health supplements, etc., require registration before import. This entails the same tedious registration or filing requirements required for products imported through the traditional trade channels. This greatly limits the inherent benefits of the CBEC model for these products.

While the government had initially intended and aimed for immediate implementation of these new regulations, protests and pressure from Chinese e-commerce companies and the ultimate objective of promoting the country’s e-commerce sector resulted in the government agreeing to a one-year transitional phase for these rules (which was to end in 2017). However, in September 2017, the government decided to extend the transitional period until the end of 2018 and to set up new trade zones for CBEC, reinforcing its support for the cross-border e-commerce sector. While changes in the regulation do seem to be a certainty in the future, the timeline for their introduction remains ambiguous as several industry analysts anticipate that they may get pushed off again.

Cross Border e-com in China

EOS Perspective

The cross-border e-commerce sector in China has been witnessing exponential growth and despite the looming new regulations, is expected to continue to grow at least over the next five years. While leading e-commerce companies in China (such as Alibaba group and JD group) have acted swiftly to benefit from this growing space, the greatest benefit has been for the foreign players who now have an easy access to Chinese consumers without the need of setting up a shop in the country. However, these benefits may be short-lived considering the new set of regulations. Few product categories such as infant formula, cosmetics, and health supplements (which have in actuality been the most popular categories for CBEC) will be subject to registration and filing requirements, thereby their so-called ‘honeymoon phase’ in the country is likely to end. Although a lot of products do not have to comply with registration/filing requirements and are only subject to a marginal increase in taxes (as per the new rules), this does not guarantee that future regulations will not impact their presence and sales in China. Therefore, while CBEC may be the smartest way for companies to test their products with limited investment in China, they may need a back-up plan in case the government further regularizes the industry to create a level-playing field for the traditional retail.

by EOS Intelligence EOS Intelligence No Comments

Infographic: Wine Industry Expects Healthy Growth in the Midst of Intense Competition and Demand Shifting Eastward

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Winemakers across the globe are not having an easy year. Global wine production is expected to hit a six-decade low in 2017, caused mostly by unfavorable weather conditions (frost and droughts in key European wine producing countries – Italy, France, and Spain, as well as severe fires in California). Even without the weather throwing roadblocks under winemakers’ feet, their line of business is not an easy one, challenged by tough competition, high import tariffs, and shifts in consumer demand. Wine market dynamics are changing, with several emerging trends that affect the way winemakers operate and the focus markets they increasingly cater to.

Global Wine Market

by EOS Intelligence EOS Intelligence No Comments

NAFTA 2.0 – Mexico Left with Little Choice but to Renegotiate, and Fast

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Over the years, NAFTA has been one of the most contentious FTAs that have ever been inked, especially for the USA. While the treaty and its merits (or mostly alleged lack of them) featured in political campaigns of a few previous US presidential candidates, NAFTA’s shape and scope have never been revisited in its many years of existence – until now. Mexico, along with Canada, wishes to maintain the NAFTA as is, however US president Donald Trump has strongly condemned the treaty and, though earlier threatened to walk away from it completely, has agreed to attempt a renegotiation. Any possible changes to the shape of NAFTA might have profound impact especially on Mexico, however, the country has little choice but to renegotiate. Some of the negotiation objectives, such as tougher ‘rules of origin’, can be greatly damaging to Mexico’s several sectors, including the automobile industry. The upcoming elections in Mexico in July 2018 may further complicate matters – if the renegotiations are not completed by then (which is a highly probable scenario), they may be brought to a standstill, especially if the government changes. This presents a great deal of uncertainty for companies that have investments in Mexico.

The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into force in 1994, removed trade tariffs and duties on most goods for trade between the USA, Mexico, and Canada. While the deal has been mostly considered a positive in Mexico and Canada, its benefits have often been debated in the USA. The main reason behind this remains the high US trade deficit with Mexico (which stood at around US$64 billion in 2016) and the loss of several US manufacturing jobs to the south of the US border.

The NAFTA issue also found itself at the center of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, as he called the treaty one of the worst trade deals ever signed by the USA and talked about withdrawing from it once he came to power. Although several previous presidential campaigns also involved talks of renegotiating NAFTA (including campaigns of both Democratic candidates – Barrack Obama and Hilary Clinton, in 2008), none has been as strong-worded as Trump’s campaign. Therefore, with Trump coming to power in 2016, revisiting the 23-year old treaty became largely inevitable.

Chapter 19

Initially threatening to back out from NAFTA, Trump agreed to renegotiations, which according to him would ensure bringing jobs back to the USA. However, a few aspects on the renegotiation agenda are a hard line for Mexico. Firstly, the USA wishes to eliminate Chapter 19 of the treaty, which encompasses a dispute settlement mechanism wherein dispute resolution (in cases such as anti-dumping and countervailing duty disagreements) is undertaken by independent and binational panels instead of domestic courts. This prevents NAFTA countries from putting unfair duties on products from other NAFTA countries to protect their own industries. While the USA is trying to disregard this clause, Mexico is largely opposing it, as without Chapter 19, it would become much easier for the USA to implement protectionist policies and duties that would inherently threaten free trade. However, Mexico is not alone in pushing back this change as Canada also strongly opposes any change in the dispute settlement mechanism.

Impact of NAFTA on Mexico

NAFTA Minimum Wage

Another negotiation objective (where Canada stands in support of the USA), is to incorporate some kind of standardization for trade-related labor issues and wages, by introducing a minimum wage across the three NAFTA participants. This will be greatly damaging for Mexico, which has for long benefited from lower wage rates that have incentivized several industries, such as automobiles, to shift base to Mexico to reduce costs and maximize profits. Stating that wage-related policies are an internal matter, Mexico has strongly opposed any such amendments and may make this a non-negotiable aspect.

Rules of Origin

However, one of the most dampening renegotiation objectives, especially for Mexico and in particular for its the automobile industry, are the restrictive changes to the rules of origin. As per the current NAFTA rules, for a car to qualify for a tariff-free entry in the NAFTA region, 62.5% of the value of the car must have originated in NAFTA countries. Thus, over the years, automobile manufactures have perfected their value chains, wherein auto components such as body-works, engines, gear panels, etc., are manufactured in various parts of NAFTA countries, and then assembled in another part of the region, to attain greatest benefits in terms of costs and quality. However, the current US administration is proposing changes to these rules, which may wash away a great deal of efficiencies and synergies attained by global automobile manufacturers under the current rules. As per the proposal, the US government aims to increase the US content in the finished vehicles to 50% for these products to attain tariff-free entry into the USA. In addition to going against the basic fabric of a free-trade agreement, this will jeopardize the competitiveness of the North American auto industry, which has greatly depended on integrated supply chains that also have deep roots in Mexico. This definitely spells bad news for Mexico, as the economy has significantly benefited from investments made by global automobile manufacturers in the country.

Moreover, apart from increasing the share of US content requirement to 50%, the US administration has also proposed raising the regional content requirement for NAFTA to 85% as against the current 62.5%. While this may seem to be a positive amendment for the region in general, analysts call it largely counter-productive as not all components can be competitively sourced from the North American region. If brought into action, automobile companies would have to spend huge sums to try to source/produce most components in the North American region at competitive prices. However, if they fail to accomplish that (which is quite likely) and as a result are unsuccessful in qualifying for tariff-free entry into NAFTA, they would shift to suppliers outside NAFTA and pay WTO tariff of 2.5% to access the North American market (which they will pass onto the consumers). Such developments might mean that by increasing regional content requirements, the region may end up pushing automobile players away from the region rather than encouraging them to continue and intensify their operations. This will be catastrophic not only for the Mexican automobile sector, but also for the US and Canadian auto market. To make matters tougher, the new proposal asks for technology-based automotive parts, electric vehicle batteries, etc., that are currently not included in the origin tracing list (as they did not exist when the NAFTA was originally negotiated). Most of these products are now sourced from Asian markets.

Due to the US president’s known cold sentiment towards NAFTA, the onus of ensuring the treaty remains unterminated is on Mexico and Canada. While Mexico (along with Canada) has previously mentioned that the American demands to change the rules of origin are unworkable with and unacceptable, the Mexican government is working on a compromise proposal to toughen the rules of origin clause in hope to meet the USA somewhere half-way. As per the proposal, Mexico is willing to accept the extensive tracing list and is also willing to negotiate on the 85% North American content requirement in exchange for the USA withdrawing from the 50% US content provision. The tracing list proposal will be drawn in a manner ensuring that low-cost technology-based components that are currently sourced from Asian countries would be sourced from within North America, especially Mexico. However, the proposal, which is not finalized yet, is not expected to be presented in the current (fifth) round of talks.

Sunset Clause

Mexico and Canada’s openness to negotiate can also be gauged by their willingness to work around the sunset clause proposed by the US administration during the fourth round of negotiations. As per the proposed clause, the treaty will expire every five years unless the member countries agree to keep it in place. While the remaining two parties refused to accept this clause when proposed, they have softened their stance on the matter during the current negotiations and counter-proposed a five-yearly review system. This showcases Mexico and Canada’s keen desire to ensure NAFTA is preserved and their willingness to work around USA’s fixed stance. While the review proposal may be a better option compared with the sunset clause, purely from a business or investment point of view, it still leaves room for a great amount of uncertainty for companies looking to invest, as five-year horizon is too short for several heavy-investment industries such as automobiles.

2018 Mexican Elections

Lastly, it is extremely critical that the negotiations are completed by the set date of March 2018 as any delay will result in their overlap with the 2018 Mexican elections and that will further complicate the matters. NAFTA has not only been instrumental in providing Mexico with economic stability, but has also played a significant political role, especially in terms of economic policy. The basic framework of the treaty has ensured protection for investments and, to an extent, economic equity as over the years it restricted the government from granting protections, incentives, and subsidies to a set of companies or industries, while discriminating against others. The termination of NAFTA would allow the future government to modify the current economic framework of the country, and this will directly impact Mexico’s attractiveness as an investment destination. This becomes all the more relevant in case the leftist candidate, Lopez Obrador, comes to power in 2018.

Mexico’s Contingency Plans

While Mexico is certainly hopeful and is working towards retaining the NAFTA, it is not putting all its eggs in that one basket alone. Mexican government is looking at deepening Mexico’s ties globally and reducing its dependence on the USA. Mexico is currently negotiating with the EU to modernize its existing FTA which is expected to be completed by the end of 2017. Moreover, it is looking at Argentina and Brazil as alternative sources of agricultural imports to replace those from the USA. In a similar move, Mexico’s foreign minister, Luis Videgaray, met with his Russian counterpart in Mexico to discuss Mexico’s openness to do business with nations other than the USA. In November 2017, Mexico participated in a meeting of the nations that were formerly a part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which ceased to exist in its previous form in early 2017 (we talked about it in our article TPP 2.0 – Minus the USA in May 2017). This meeting resulted in an official announcement that the TPP nations will negotiate a new deal, without the USA, and that it will be called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The creation of CPTPP will provide a much-needed cushion to Mexico’s automobile industry in case NAFTA fails. Also, in case NAFTA toughens its rules of origin but the CPTPP relaxes them, Mexico may continue to be part of the global automobile supply chain (this time in combination with CPTPP members such as Japan, Canada, and Chile – instead of the USA).

EOS Perspective

It is safe to say that Mexico and its automobile industry have a lot riding on the NAFTA negotiations. While Mexico along with Canada are working hard to ensure NAFTA stays, US president’s tough stand on several aspects and his willingness to walk out of the deal in case his demands are not met, complicate the negotiations greatly. It is uncertain how the situation is going to develop, and even if NAFTA continues, new provisions that might find their way into the revised treaty may not offer a great deal of benefits for companies to invest and for intra-regional trade to flourish.

The pressure of upcoming elections in Mexico in 2018 makes the situation even tighter. If the negotiations are not completed before the elections, all progress made up till then can easily go in vain in the event of the government change. Therefore, companies are extremely cautious about investing/expanding in Mexico at the moment, and are likely to wait at least up till mid-next year. They may find respite in the fact that the Mexican government is trying to do its best – both in terms of being flexible during negotiations as well as diversifying its export markets and import sources – but this respite might just not be enough to ease investors’ minds and businesses’ worries over the operating and trade environment within the North American region.

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EU-Mercosur FTA: Old Negotiations, New Zest

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The EU and Mercosur (a trade bloc comprising Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay*) free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations date back almost two decades, to 1999. After failing to seal the deal in 1999 and again in 2004, the countries initiated new negotiations in 2010 and though started out slowly, they accelerated the process in 2016 (with hopes to finalize the deal by the end of 2017). A trade deal at this moment will be of significant importance to both sides owing to substantial amount of trade between the two blocs. The EU is Mercosur’s largest trading partner accounting for 21% of the bloc’s trade in 2015, while Brazil alone is the EU’s eleventh largest trading partner. However, despite a positive framework for the agreement to happen, there is still a great deal of resistance from few EU countries regarding the opening up of their agriculture sectors. Now it remains to see whether the two blocs can reach the much needed compromises and end up with an agreement by the end of the year or talks will remain hanging once more.
*Venezuela has been suspended from the trade bloc in 2016 and therefore is out of the negotiations

While this may not be the first time the EU and Mercosur sit to negotiate the terms of an FTA, it definitely seems to be the most promising one. The main reason the earlier efforts have gone in vain was the Argentinian leftist government’s adverse stance on trading outside their own backyard. This changed with the election of president Mauricio Macri in December 2015, who unlike his predecessor (Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner), looks at international trade as a growth opportunity for Argentina. Similarly, the impeachment of the Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff in May 2016 resulted in a new political wave in Brazil. While Brazil’s former president did take small steps towards trade liberalization, her successor, Michel Temer, has accelerated this process and has made the EU-Mercosur deal one of his top priorities.

Another reason this deal has gained immense importance for the Latin American bloc has been a declining bilateral trade among Mercosur’s two largest members, Argentina and Brazil, owing to recession. Trade between the countries declined from US$36 billion to US$22 billion during 2013-2016. This has forced the two nations to soften their stance on global trade.

Considering these developments, as well as the changing political and trade dynamics between several Latin American countries and the USA, following the arrival of Trumps administration at the White House, Mercosur’s openness and renewed interest in strengthening international trade ties is fully understandable. We wrote about it in February 2017 in our article Trump in Action: Triumph or Tremor for Latin America? and again later in June 2017 in Japan Hopes to Get a Slice of Mercosur Opportunity Cake as LATAM Exports to USA Decline.

On the other side of the negotiations table, as the EU has maintained a positive outlook towards foreign trade in general, the lost prospect of a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the USA under Donald Trump has also reinvigorated EU’s interest in the Mercosur FTA. Moreover, the EU views the deal with Mercosur as a suitable counter-measure to the growing Chinese influence in Latin America.

Apart from these aspects, the main reason for renewed commitment to the deal by both sides is the significant and increasing level of trade and investment between the two blocs. In 2014, EU’s investments in Mercosur countries reached US$494 billion. The EU’s exports to Mercosur expanded from about US$24.6 billion (€21 billion) in 2005 to about US$54 billion (€46 billion) in 2015. Similarly for Mercosur, its exports to the EU increased from US$37.5 billion (€32 billion) to US$49 billion (€42 billion) during the same period. Agriculture products constituted 48% of Mercosur’s exports to the EU, while machinery (29% of exports) and vehicle and parts (17% of exports) were EU’s largest export categories to the Latin American bloc.

The EU stands to gain a great deal from the FTA. As per current calculations, EU exporters would save about US$5.2 billion (€4.4 billion) annually on trade tariffs and stand to double their exports within five years of reaching a deal.

Despite hefty trade benefits and a lot of political and economic factors being in favor of the deal, agriculture remains a sore point. Several EU countries, led by France, do not want to open up their agriculture sector to Mercosur’s exports as they feel their domestic produce (especially grains and meat) cannot compete with that of Brazil and Argentina in terms of price. In addition, they are concerned that Mercosur’s agricultural produce are not subject to the same health standards as their domestic produce.

A quick glance at the average production costs indicates that the EU farmers have a reason to worry. As per estimates, if the deal comes through, the amount of maize available in Brazil and Argentina for export by 2020 will be between 23 and 26 million tonnes. While the average production cost of cereal in Mercosur is close to US$94/ tonne (€80/tonne), it is about US$141/tonne (€120/tonne) in the EU. This is likely to result in substitution of EU-grown maize with that from Mercosur, which will most likely result in a loss of about US$2.3 billion (€2 billion) by 2020 for EU’s agriculture sector. In addition, it can be expected to result in an indirect loss of about US$1.2-3.5 billion (€1-3 billion) as Mercosur-produced maize is likely to also replace wheat for animal feed during high production and harvest months.

In case of meat products, beef produced in Mercosur is more competitive than EU’s beef in terms of pricing. Moreover, a study of the usual trend of beef quotas suggest that they are first filled with noble cuts exports (including filet, entrecote, and rump steak) followed by other hindquarter cuts (such as topside and silverside). In case the deal takes place, it is expected that Mercosur’s beef will largely substitute local beef produce with Mercosur’s export volume (keeping in mind higher quantities of noble cuts, such as Hilton beef) expecting to reach 1 million tonnes. These would be worth US$18.8 billion (€16 billion) and would directly impact the local production and sales value. To bring this into perspective, the value of Brazil’s beef exports (the largest beef exporter among the Mercosur countries) to the EU was US$485 million in 2016. Moreover, low-priced imports from Mercosur will put pressure on the pricing in the domestic EU market resulting in close to a 30% downward price revision, which in turn is highly likely to result in further losses of about US$10.6 billion (€9 billion). In case the EU agreed to 300,000 tonnes at zero duty, this would expectedly result in US$3.5 billion (€3 billion) in direct costs and US$7.1 billion in indirect costs (€6 billion).

In addition to this, there are several non-tariff related issues with Mercosur’s produce, such as lack of tagging and traceability of livestock to identify and guarantee origin. Also, several drugs, such as hormones and growth promoters, as well as few antibiotics and insecticides that are banned in the EU are legally used in Mercosur. These factors have resulted in countries such as France, Ireland, and Poland opposing the EU-Mercosur FTA.

Another source of disagreement for the EU lies in the trade of sugar and ethanol, which the European producers claim should be excluded from the list of freely-traded items. This stems primarily from the fact that the Brazilian government provides subsidies worth US$1.8 billion annually to its ethanol and sugar producers, a fact providing them with an undue advantage compared to the European counterparts.

On the other hand, Mercosur is discontent with EU’s limited concessions on agricultural imports and its stance to continue quotas on the Mercosur’s food imports. Mercosur also has some concerns regarding providing the EU with access to public tenders, which in Brazil alone are worth about US$176 billion (€150 billion), however, they are positive that they will be able to reach a consensus during negotiations.

While few points of contention remain, negotiators at both ends are keen on resolving these issues and signing the deal by the end of 2017, remaining aware of the significance of this deal for both the sides as well as of the tendency for these talks to remain unresolved if not pushed soon. Moreover, both sides want to exploit the current favorable political scenario in Brazil and Argentina. With Brazil heading for presidential elections in 2018, the chances of a leftist-government coming to power do exist, and this can again put the deal in danger if it is not completed by then. Both sides of the negotiating table want to reach an agreement sought-after for the past 20 years as early as possible, even if it means compromising on some expectations.

EU Mercosur FTA Old Negotiations New Zest

EOS Perspective

A goal of completing the deal by the end of 2017 seems like quite a gun to the heads of both the blocs, as past experience, both in the case of this deal as well as other FTAs, proves that the process is never quick nor simple. Moreover, the EU seems somewhat divided on the deal, with Spain, Portugal, and Germany advocating for it and France, Poland, and Ireland opposing it. That being said, this deal – which has been on and off again and again since 1999 – has never been as close to getting finalized as it is now. This is primarily due to the fact that both Argentina and Brazil (that were the two main factors holding the deal back all these years) are extremely keen on reaching this agreement with EU, to the extent that they may be willing to compromise quite a bit as long as the deal includes provisions that leave room for future improvements and it brings increase in trade and thus growth for local economies. However, it remains to be seen whether they will be willing to stretch their compromises far enough to agree to the EU’s terms on the agriculture produce trade. At the same time, it is not clear how much the EU is going to push for these provisions, so there is a chance that both parties will manage to reach a well-rounded deal for both the sides. The least probable scenario is that the deal will come to a stand-still once more, however till the ink dries on the deal, nothing can be considered as certain.

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USA-China Solar Dispute – Will Sanctions Really Aid the US Solar Market?

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Trade disputes are not a rare sight in the current competitive era. Especially the USA and China have a history of such disputes in last couple of decades and both have locked horns again, this time over solar equipment trade. Chinese manufacturers are being accused of unfair trade practices as they sell solar modules at a considerably lower prices than producers from other countries, using government subsidies to finance their operations and to create a glut of imports. In response to such a practice, American manufactures filed a petition with US International Trade Commission (USITC) seeking steep tariffs and a floor price for the Chinese solar imports. The commission voted on the merits of the petition in late September 2017, and decided that there has indeed been a considerable damage to the US manufacturers. The USITC’s recommendations for sanctions will be sent to the White House to decide the course of action in the following month. If sanctions are introduced, will the US producers be the ultimate winner after the final verdict in November?

The solar power generation technology was invented in the USA which have dominated the solar industry for last three decades of 20th century. The global solar industry is now a US$100 billion market, a fact that leads to a large number of players being interested in grabbing their share of this mammoth opportunity. As solar energy is considered clean and renewable, countries suffering from high pollution levels increasingly demand efficient and cheap solar energy generation equipment.

This strong demand is expected to continue, luring many players around the globe towards venturing into solar equipment manufacturing and this in turn has led to intense competition in this market. With China rising as a manufacturer of cheaper solar equipment since 2011, it has become increasingly difficult for other players to compete with China, and many producers, especially in the USA, are not very pleased with that.

This strong demand is expected to continue, luring many players around the globe towards venturing into solar equipment manufacturing and this in turn has led to intense competition in this market.

This is not the first solar battle between the USA and China. The countries were in a solar dispute back in 2011 when the USA hit China with 25-70% tariffs on solar module exports. It was due to a trade complaint filed by SolarWorld Americas along with six other US manufacturers about unethical trade practices undertaken by their Chinese counterparts. And now, Suniva, a Georgia-based solar cell and module manufacturer, filed a Safeguard Petition with the USITC in April 2017, just one week after it had filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.

The USITC, in its unanimous vote, agreed that the US companies suffered injury from cheap imports. Following these developments, the markets are waiting for the president Trump’s decision over the case in November, and if the White House follows with sanctions and remedies, this might be the beginning of a significant wave of changes in the solar equipment market.

China has not always been the market leader for solar products. Way back in 1990s, when Germany could not meet its rising domestic demand for solar equipment, it started working with Chinese players to manufacture the equipment for German market. Germany did not only provide the capital and technology but also some of their solar energy experts to those Chinese manufacturers.

The high demand was a result of German government’s incentive program to use the rooftop solar panels. Needless to say, those Chinese players happily accepted the opportunity. Further they got lured with the rising demand for solar equipment in other European countries such as Spain and Italy, where similar incentive programs started to be rolled out. The Chinese producers started hiring experts and expanding their capacities to tap the surge in demand.

With rising pollution levels and global demand for cleaner energy, solar industry became an attractive opportunity for China, and this resulted in the government’s willingness to invest as much as US$47 billion to develop China’s solar industry. With the beginning of 21st century, China started inviting foreign companies to set up plants in the country and take benefit of its cheap labor.

The Chinese government also introduced loans and tax incentives for renewable energy equipment manufacturers. By 2010, the solar equipment production in China increased at such levels that there were almost two panels made for every one demanded by an importer. In 2011, China took the German route and started incentivizing domestic rooftop solar installations, which rocketed the domestic demand so much that it surpassed Germany’s in 2015 to become the largest globally. China deployed 20 GW capacity in the first half of 2016, whereas the entire US capacity at that time was 31 GW.

The Chinese government started perceiving solar power generation as a strategic industry. It started a range of initiatives to help the domestic manufacturers to increase production of solar equipment, be it through subsidies for the purchase of the land for factories or through lower interest loans from banks. These moves and gigantic Chinese production capacities drove the global solar panel prices down by 80% from 2008 to 2013, which further increased China’s exports as its prices were the lowest.

Before 2009, the USA used to import very little from China in the solar domain and by the end of 2013, the Chinese imports rose to over 49% of total solar panels deployed in the USA. This increase in the imports resulted in 26 US solar manufacturers filing for bankruptcy in 2011, one of which was SolarWorld which also filed a trade complaint. The situation was not very different in several European countries.

The Chinese government started perceiving solar power generation as a strategic industry. It started a range of initiatives to help the domestic manufacturers to increase production of solar equipment.

China was accused of unfair trading and dumping exports below market prices which led the Obama government and EU to imposing import duties of 25-70% on Chinese solar products in 2011 for the following four years. In return, in 2012 China threatened to impose tariffs on US imports of polysilicon used in solar cells, and actually announced tariffs of 53.5% to 57% in 2013. Also, finding loopholes in the tariff system imposed by the Americans, Chinese manufacturers set up facilities in countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam, as the tariffs were not applicable for imports from those countries. The US imports of Chinese solar products continued.

The current Suniva’s case has received a mixed support within the US solar industry. While the US solar installers, for obvious reasons, will not support the case, some of the well-known manufacturers in the country have also stood up against it. They think the tariffs will almost double the prices of solar equipment in the USA which will eventually lower the demand of their products as well.

Following the USITC vote agreeing with Suniva’s petition, the industry is awaiting the final decision on the extent of the recommended tariffs and remedies, which are expected to affect jobs, innovation, and growth of the solar industry in various ways.

Impact of tariff decision on jobs in solar industry

Out of the total 260,000 US solar jobs, installers accounted for more than 80%, and around 38,000 people were working in manufacturing in 2016, a 26% increase over 2015. As the prices of solar panels dropped to around US$0.4/watt in 2016 from US$0.57/watt in 2015 thanks to the availability of cheap Chinese imports, solar installations boomed in the USA.

Manufacturers and experts supporting the Suniva case (supporters) argue that if the suggested tariffs of US$0.4/watt on imported cells and a minimum price of US$0.78/watt on panels are implemented, it will help the domestic manufacturing and around 114,800 new jobs will be created. The installers and some manufacturers opposing the case (adversaries) say that the tariffs on import will hurt everyone including the manufacturing sector. If the prices increase, this will cause the demand to go down which is likely to affect around 88,000 jobs in the US solar industry.

A group of 27 US solar equipment manufacturers including companies such as PanelClaw, Aerocompact, IronRidge, SMASHsolar, Pegasus Solar, on behalf of their combined 5,700 employees, wrote a letter to trade commissioners not to impose new import tariffs. With Chinese solar imports as high as 49% of the total US requirement, increased prices are expected to affect thousands of jobs in the solar installation sector which is the primary sub-sector of solar industry.

However, if the Chinese imports continue at the current rate, the demand for solar equipment will eventually decrease. Over long term, the manufacturers will have to lower their production and installers will have no new clients. So, the economy of scale effect will not work after that and that might affect the US solar jobs.

Impact of tariff decision on innovation in solar industry

The one factor that genuinely seems affected with the rise of China in the solar industry is innovation. Being the pioneers of the solar power generation technology, Americans are undoubtedly good at innovation. However, with dozens of US companies being on the verge of bankruptcy and lowering sales for remaining manufacturers because of glut of cheaper Chinese imports, the innovation budgets have seen a large blow in the country.

China is still producing the first generation, traditional solar modules and doing little, if anything at all, to improve the efficiency of the existing products. Chinese are not known for investing much in R&D departments and top seven Chinese solar manufacturers invested a mere 1.25% of total sales in R&D in 2015. Compared with what electronics firms invested in 2015 towards R&D, this number is six times lower. Compared with US clean energy firms, Chinese firms patent 72% less.

However, the US innovation receives targeted help and support from the government, which is not the case for Chinese innovation. US Department of Energy has come up with a loan program of US$32 billion to help clean energy companies innovate efficient solar products while still being price competitive with Chinese products. Nonetheless, US innovations are expected to dry up if the Chinese solar equipment dumping continues.

US-China Solar Dispute

Impact of tariff decision on solar industry growth

Growth of the solar industry should probably be the prime factor to consider for the Trade Commission and the White House while deciding about the potential introduction of solar tariffs.

As of 2016, US solar industry is worth roughly around US$23 billion. Moreover, solar energy accounted for 40% of new generation in the US power grid and 10% of total renewable energy generated in the USA in 2016, while the recent cost declines have led American utilities to procure more solar energy. This energy has witnessed 68% of average annual growth rate in terms of new generation capacity in the USA in last decade and as of first half of 2017, over 47 GW of solar capacity is installed to power 9.1 million American houses. There are currently about 9,000 solar companies in the USA employing around 260,000 people. In 2016, solar power generation was at 0.9% of total US power generation, a share that is expected to grow to more than 3% in 2020 and hit 5% in 2022.

The Suniva case supporters believe that this growth can slow down once the solar equipment demand is satisfied through Chinese imports, which is likely to eventually lead to job cuts and no innovation that in turn will put a break on any further growth in the US sector. They also argue that the solar equipment manufacturing sector in the USA will be destroyed if the right steps are not taken to safeguard the manufacturers from cheaper imports.

After the tariffs are introduced, for some time, the prices will be parallel for locally manufactured as well as imported solar products. Later on, with innovation and competitiveness between the domestic manufacturers coming back (currently absent from US solar market), the prices are expected to go down as per the allies.

At the same time, the Suniva case adversaries believe that the dream run for solar industry’s growth in the USA should not be hindered by imposing tariffs on imports as it will jeopardize even up to half of all solar installations expected to be demanded by 2022. In case of US$0.78/watt minimum module price scenario, US solar equipment installation is expected to fall from 72.5 GW to 36.4 GW between 2018 and 2022 or to 25 GW in case of US$1.18/watt minimum price scenario.

Solar energy is believed to be price sensitive and if the government aims to motivate the clean energy development, the origin of equipment used for this development should not matter. Some of the US solar equipment manufacturers are even opposing the tariffs which means they think there is still potential in the domestic manufacturing industry and with innovation they can gradually increase their share in the market.

EOS Perspective

The US government will have to take a responsible decision on the trade tariffs. The issue looks very sensitive and can directly affect the growth of the US energy sector. A win-win situation seems impossible if the tariffs are levied, and in its deliberations the government should consider the effects of the past US tariffs imposed on Chinese products. When the USA took anti-dumping steps against Chinese steel, China fired back with tariffs on caprolactam, a textile material. China re-imposed duties on US broiler chickens, after the USA announced duties on Chinese tires in June 2015.

So, none of the trade wars have proved to be beneficial for either of the sides. In the current dispute, the stakes are also high, and the wrong decision might have repercussions in a range of sectors. For instance, China placed a US$38 billion order to Boeing for commercial aircraft in 2015, an order that has not been delivered yet. This aspect should be kept in mind by the USA.

China currently dominates solar products supply with 80% of global solar equipment manufacturing capacity. The USA need to understand that their role in the global solar market is decreasing, and is no longer what it used to be. It would be beneficial for the USA to focus on strengthening the role in innovation of solar technology rather than looking to be the leading solar equipment manufacturer by volume.

Even if the US government supports the manufacturers by slapping tariffs on imports, the country is not ready with the required infrastructure for solar generation equipment manufacturing to satisfy the domestic demand in absence of the imports from other countries. Solar equipment producers cannot instantly set up infrastructure to manufacture a number of solar products, such as solar cells, junction boxes, extruded aluminum, glass, etc., that too in a cost-effective model. President Trump’s support for reviving local manufacturing, while at the same time favoring fossil fuels over the green energy (also manifested through his withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord), makes the outcome of the case uncertain, and interesting to follow.

by EOS Intelligence EOS Intelligence No Comments

OBOR – What’s in Store for Multinational Companies?

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One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative, also known as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is part of China’s development strategy to improve its trade relations with countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. OBOR envisions to not just bring economic benefits to China but to also help other participating countries by integrating their development strategies along the way. It has the potential to be one of the most successful economic development initiatives globally. Opportunities are countless for investment along this route. Multinational companies are looking to make the most out of this project, however, capitalizing on this opportunity will not be easy. To benefit from this initiative, companies need to understand that assiduous research and effective long-term planning is crucial, as the nations involved, though offer economic growth, will also present a series of geopolitical risks and challenges.

Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled OBOR in 2013, aiming to improve relations and create new links and business opportunities between China and 64 other countries included in the OBOR. The initiative has two main segments: The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), a land route designed to connect China with Central Asia, Eastern and Western Europe, and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), a sea route that runs west from China’s east coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and east to the South Pacific. These two routes will form six economic corridors as the framework of the initiative outside China – New Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor, China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor, China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor, China-Pakistan Corridor, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor.

OBOR brings opportunities and challenges

Multinational companies will have a plethora of opportunities to explore along these economic corridors – for instance, trading companies can take advantage of these routes for logistics, while energy companies can use these corridors as gateways for exploring new sites of natural resources such as oil and natural gas. Along with dedicated routes, OBOR will require huge investment which is proposed to come from three infrastructure financing institutions set up as a part of this initiative – Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), The Silk Road Fund (SRF), and The New Development Bank (NDB).

The development of OBOR opens up a range of opportunities for overseas businesses. However, with the initiative being launched by the Chinese government and all the six corridors running across the country, it is clear that China will play a major role in most of the business collaborations. Thus, multinational companies investing in OBOR can prefer to partner with Chinese companies and leverage the partnership to access projects and assignments in other countries. Companies are also likely to be able to access new routes to sell products cheaply and efficiently, but looking for opportunities across OBOR would definitely involve initial partnerships between multinationals and Chinese state-owned enterprises.

OBOR – What’s in Store for Multinational Companies

Oil, gas, coal, and electricity

OBOR has the potential to open up opportunities for collaboration in the areas of oil, gas, coal, and electricity. Several energy opportunities may emerge with the OBOR initiative, and these energy-related investment projects are likely to be an important part of OBOR. For instance, the Gwadar-Nawabshal LNG Terminal and Pipeline in Pakistan includes building an LNG terminal in the Balochistan province and a gas pipeline between Iran and central Pakistan. Estimated at a total value of US$46 billion, the project was announced in October 2015 along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Energy projects along OBOR include initiatives largely by Chinese companies due to funds coming in from China-led financial institutions. In another investment, General Electric, an American corporation, signed a pact with China National Machinery Industry Corporation (Sinomach), in 2015, to offer project contracting (for supply of machinery and hardware tools) for developing a 102-MW Kipeto wind project in Kenya. The project aims to set up 2,036 MW of installed capacity from wind power by 2030. Kipeto wind project was originally a part of US president Barack Obama’s ‘Power Africa’ initiative, but with Sinomach joining in hands, it is clear that more initiatives like this can be expected to come up in the near future as a part of OBOR.

Logistics

Players in the logistics industry can also benefit from the improved infrastructure along the OBOR. In 2015, DHL Global Forwarding, providing air and ocean freight forwarding services, started its first service on the southern rail corridor between China and Turkey, a critical segment of China’s OBOR initiative. This rail corridor is expected to strengthen Turkey’s trading businesses along with benefiting transport and freight industries of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Logistics companies can also initially partner with local postal or freight agencies to set up new business in these regions. OBOR can provide fast, cost-effective, and high-frequency connections between countries along the route. Improved infrastructure, reduced logistics costs, and better transport infrastructure will also contribute to driving e-commerce businesses in the regions.

Tourism

Tourism is expected to also see a major boost as a result of OBOR initiative. As connectivity between countries improve and new locations become easily accessible, the tourism industry is expected to see positive growth in the coming years. To support tourism, Evergreen Offshore Inc., a Hong Kong-based private equity firm, in 2016, launched a US$1.28 billion tourism-focused private equity fund called Asia Pacific One Belt One Road Tourism Industry Fund to boost relations between China and Malaysia by investing in tourism sector. The company invested in Malaysia as the country is considered an ideal investment destination for a long-term gain. This is in sync with the long term vision of OBOR to promote tourism sector in countries and regions along the MSR.

As OBOR develops, new markets along the routes are likely to open to business. The already existing routes will experience business diversification as infrastructure and connectivity improves. Trade barriers will most likely reduce as developing countries become more open to international investment which brings new jobs, better infrastructure, economic growth, and improved quality of life. There is bound to be growth in consulting business, professional services, and industrial sectors apart from trade and logistics.

EOS Perspective

While OBOR initiative assures opportunities for multinational companies, the path may not be smooth for all. Investing in these new geographies, companies will come across various economies with different legal and regulatory frameworks. Political stability is also a matter of concern – some regions may have sound political structures while others may be dealing with ineffective government policies. In fact, political instability and violence are some of the key challenges in the development of OBOR. Weak government policies and lack of communal benefit lead to political instability including terrorism and riots. These factors influence the availability of resources, negatively impact the setting up of businesses locally, thus resulting in financial losses for multinationals. Local investments need policies and investment protection backed by the governments to facilitate growth which is far more difficult to achieve in case of political and economic instability. Taking advantage of the opportunities associated with OBOR may be of strategic importance, but the companies need to be cautious about the obstacles associated with it.

While OBOR initiative assures opportunities for multinational companies, the path may not be smooth for all. Political instability and violence are some of the key challenges in the development of OBOR.

Local competitors will also present obstacles to multinational firms. The competition is stiff for international players as local companies can operate better in riskier environment at low operating costs. Not only will regional companies pose a threat for survival of multinationals, in many scenarios, partnering with Chinese companies will also be a massive challenge. Many Chinese companies do not implement a clear structure while partnering with other international companies. Decision making and profit sharing is often not properly documented. Lack of clarity in business dealings give these state-owned enterprises an upper hand.

Complexity and lack of transparency in local regulatory framework for setting up a new business is also a hindrance for investments in many geographies along the OBOR. Absence of clear policies and delays in decision-making processes can prove too challenging for companies to adapt to which may even lead to financial losses or failed attempts to establish local operations. Issues such as corruption, challenges associated with supply chain security, and financial risks are some of the other obstacles that companies are likely to face while setting up businesses in new countries along the OBOR route.

Complexity and lack of transparency in local regulatory framework are a hindrance for investments in many geographies along the OBOR.

OBOR is still in the initial years of implementation. The initiative offers great potential for developing regions in need for improved infrastructure and economic growth but what this really means for multinational companies is still somewhat unclear. It encourages participation from international companies to turn the initiative a success, but there are no clear guidelines on how these investments would be integrated into the OBOR. With a major part of investment coming from China-based institutions, dominance of Chinese companies in major projects cannot be avoided. While the underlying aim of the initiative is to reduce China’s industrial overcapacity and to strengthen its economy, there are concerns about the part being played by multinational companies. To what extent would they participate, who would be the main investor (Chinese company or multinational companies), and how much share and what say would the multinational company have in a project, etc., are some of the questions that still remain unanswered.

With major part of investment coming from China-based institutions, dominance of Chinese companies in major projects cannot be avoided.

In view of these risks and challenges, we believe it is too early to estimate the scale of potential monetary benefits for companies wanting to invest along the OBOR route to expand their businesses. It will surely not be easy for multinational companies to compete for benefits from OBOR in an environment heavily dominated by Chinese companies. Developing business policies and financing schemes through related institutions can help the multinational firms to benefit from this initiative in the long run. There is no doubt that OBOR has the potential to open new markets for doing business by redrawing the global trade map, however, with no clarity and transparency on the role MNC’s as part of OBOR initiative, companies need to correctly identify the best opportunity by accessing the right market and find effective ways to mitigate a wide range of associated risks. For now, the future role of MNC’s in this environment is uncertain. They will have to wait and watch to work out a stable business arrangement. But in current times of global geopolitical turbulence, such a harmony is never guaranteed.

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